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Summary
The 109th Congress is considering how to address the risks and consequences
of potential terrorist attacks on chemical facilities.  This report compares and
analyzes two bills introduced in the Senate that would address these issues, S. 2145
and S. 2486.  For background information on chemical facility security and
summaries of other legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL31530, Chemical
Facility Security.  For more information about alternative legislative approaches, see
CRS Report RL33043, Legislative Approaches to Chemical Facility Security.
S. 2145 would direct the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to promulgate rules for designating chemical facilities that would be subject
to regulation, assigning these facilities to various risk-based tiers and establishing
performance-based security standards for each tier.  Designated facilities would be
selected from among those required to complete risk management plans under the
Clean Air Act (CAA), Section 112(r)(7), as well as facilities handling more than
specified quantities of ammonium nitrate or any other substance designated by the
Secretary.  Designated facilities would be required to submit to DHS vulnerability
assessments, security plans, and emergency response plans for terrorist incidents.
Plans would have to be “sufficient to deter, to the maximum extent practicable, a
terrorist incident or a substantial threat of such an incident,” and “include security
measures to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist incident.”  To oversee
implementation, S. 2145 establishes regional DHS security offices and area security
committees and plans.  DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies would be
prohibited from releasing to the public vulnerability assessments, site security plans,
security addenda to emergency response plans, area security plans, or materials
developed or produced exclusively in preparation for assessments or plans.
S. 2486 addresses security and safety at “stationary sources,” which are defined
by reference to the CAA Section 112(r)(2), and other facilities holding substances of
concern that the DHS Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), designates as “high priority.”  For all
stationary sources, S. 2486 would establish a general duty to identify hazards; ensure
safe facility design, operation, and maintenance (including use of use of inherently
safer technology [IST]); and reduce the consequences of a criminal release.
Employees would assist owners or operators in these tasks.  Each high-priority
facility would be required to submit to DHS a vulnerability assessment, hazard
assessment, and prevention, preparedness, and response plan.  S. 2486 would exempt
DHS from public disclosure requirements of the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) for “all documents provided to the DHS Secretary under this Act, and all
information that describes a specific vulnerability or stationary source derived from
those documents.”  S. 2486 establishes Employees’ Safety and Security Committees
and mandates employee training with respect to the Act’s requirements.
This report highlights key similarities and differences of these bills and
summarizes selected key provisions in Table 1.  The report will be updated as
warranted by congressional activity.
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1 Recordings of the four hearings are available on the Committee’s website.  They are
“Chemical Attack on America: How Vulnerable Are We?” held April 27, 2005; “Is the
Federal Government Doing Enough to Secure Chemical Facilities and Is More Authority
Needed?” held June 15, 2005; “Chemical Facility Security: What Is the Appropriate Federal
Role?”  held July 13, 2005; and “Chemical Facility Security: What Is the Appropriate
Federal Role? (Part II),” held July 27, 2005.  The House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity also held
a hearing on this issue on June 15, 2005, “Preventing Terrorist Attacks on America’s
Chemical Plants.”  A recording of the House hearing is not posted on the Committee
website, but a transcript is available on the Congressional Quarterly website at
[http://www.cq.com/].
Senate Proposals To Enhance Chemical
 Facility Security 
Introduction
The 109th Congress is considering how to address the risks and consequences
of potential terrorist attacks on chemical facilities.  Competing bills S. 2145 and S.
2486 have been introduced in the Senate.  Other legislation has been introduced in
the House, including a companion to S. 2145 (H.R. 4999).  Two other proposals,
H.R. 1562 and H.R. 2237, are similar to proposals in the 108th Congress.  This report
focuses on legislation in the Senate.  For background information on chemical facility
security and summaries of other legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL31530,
Chemical Facility Security, by Linda-Jo Schierow.  For more information on
alternative legislative approaches, see CRS Report RL33043, Legislative Approaches
to Chemical Facility Security, by Dana A. Shea.
S. 2145 and S. 2486 direct the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to designate “substances of concern” and high-priority facilities for
regulation.  Both bills require assessments of vulnerability for designated facilities
and preparation and implementation of security plans.  Beyond these basic
provisions, however, the bills would mandate facility actions, federal oversight
mechanisms, and other requirements that differ in significant and often controversial
ways.  The purpose of this report is to summarize key provisions of the two bills,
highlighting selected areas of disagreement and agreement.
S. 2145 (Collins)
Senator Collins, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee (HSGAC), introduced S. 2145, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act,
on December 19, 2005, following four full Committee hearings on the subject.1  Co-
sponsors on introduction included Senator Lieberman (the HSGAC Ranking
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2 The list of regulated substances may be found at 40 CFR 68.130.  Risk management
planning is required to reduce and mitigate the risk to neighboring communities of
accidental releases from facilities handling more than a threshold quantity of any of the 140
listed substances.
Member), Senator Coleman, Senator Carper, and Senator Levin, all Members of the
HSGAC.
Chemical Sources and Substances of Concern.  S. 2145 would direct
the DHS Secretary to promulgate rules for designating chemical facilities (referred
to in the legislation as “chemical sources”) that would be subject to regulation,
assigning these facilities to various risk-based tiers and establishing performance-
based security standards for each tier.  Facilities would be considered for designation
if they produced, used, or stored a substance of concern in a quantity equal to or
greater than a threshold quantity.  To assist DHS in identifying facilities, the bill
would establish a duty to report to DHS for facilities handling more than a threshold
quantity of a designated substance of concern. Substances of concern would be those
that trigger risk management planning requirements under the Clean Air Act (CAA),
Section 112(r)(7),2 as well as ammonium nitrate and any other substance designated
by the Secretary.  A decision to designate a substance must be based on the potential
extent of death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health and safety or the
environment, or the potential impact on national or economic security or critical
infrastructure caused by a terrorist incident.
Vulnerability Assessments and Planning Requirements.  Designated
facilities would be assigned to risk-based tiers and required to complete and submit
to DHS vulnerability assessments, security plans, and emergency response plans for
terrorist incidents.  DHS would be required to review these submissions.  For
facilities in the higher risk tiers, S. 2145 would require a DHS determination to
approve, disapprove, or modify facility assessments and plans within two years of the
date of enactment and within one year of the date when DHS issues regulations
concerning assessments and plans.
S. 2145 would require intergovernmental coordination by facility owners or
operators who would be required to specify in their plans “steps taken by the
chemical source to coordinate security measures and plans for response to a terrorist
incident with Federal, State, and local government officials, including law enforce-
ment and first responders.”  Plans would have to be “sufficient to deter, to the
maximum extent practicable, a terrorist incident or a substantial threat of such an
incident,” and “include security measures to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist
incident.”
Enforcement.  S. 2145 would provide administrative, civil, and criminal
penalties for facility owners or operators who fail to submit assessments or plans or
to implement plans adequately.  DHS would be authorized to issue an order for the
chemical source to cease operation if the facility persisted in noncompliance with the
requirements established under S. 2145.
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3 The CAA §112(r)(2)(C) defines a “stationary source” to mean “any buildings, structures,
equipment, installations, or substance-emitting stationary activities (i) which belong to the
same industrial group, (ii) which are located on one or more contiguous properties, (iii)
which are under the control of the same person (or persons under common control), and (iv)
from which an accidental release may occur.”  The CAA §112(r)(2)(A) defines “accidental
release” to mean “an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely
hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary source.”  The CAA §112(r)(2)(B)
defines “regulated substance” to mean “a substance listed under [CAA §112(r)] paragraph
(3).”
Coordination.  The bill would mandate coordination with existing security
and emergency response planning, including planning under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA).  To ensure coordination, S. 2145 establishes
regional security offices and area security committees and plans.  State and local laws
would not be preempted unless they were inconsistent with federal law.
Information Disclosure.  DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies
would be prohibited from releasing to the public vulnerability assessments, site
security plans, security addenda to emergency response plans, area security plans, or
materials developed or produced exclusively in preparation for assessments or plans.
However, the bill would require public disclosure of written certifications of
compliance by facility owners/operators, DHS certificates of compliance issued for
individual sources, DHS orders issued for noncompliance, and lists of facilities for
which DHS has issued an approval or disapproval, unless the Secretary determines
that release of a particular record would increase security risk.
Other Accountability Measures.  Other provisions would require reports
by DHS and GAO, establish a process by which any person may submit a report to
DHS regarding vulnerabilities of a chemical source, and protect whistle-blowers from
retaliation.
S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Senator Lautenberg, a member of the HSGAC, introduced the Chemical
Security and Safety Act of 2006 (S. 2486) on March 30, 2006.  Co-sponsors on
introduction included Senator Obama, Senator Kerry, Senator Menendez, Senator
Durbin, and Senator Biden.
Chemical Sources and Substances of Concern.  S. 2486 addresses
security and safety at “stationary sources,” which are defined by reference to the
CAA Section 112(r)(2),3 but also to include other facilities that produce, process,
handle, or store any “substance of concern” and which the DHS Secretary designates
as “high priority.”  Substances of concern are defined as substances listed under the
CAA Section 112(r)(3) in a threshold quantity or any other substance designated by
the Secretary under section 5(d) of the Chemical Security and Safety Act in a
threshold quantity.
 The DHS Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), would be directed to designate by rule at
least 3,000 facilities handling substances of concern as “high priority categories.”  In
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designating high-priority facilities, the Secretary would be directed to consider
potential severity of harm; proximity to population centers; threats to national
security; threats to critical infrastructure; threshold quantities of substances of
concern that pose a serious threat; and other safety or security factors that the DHS
Secretary, in consultation with the EPA Administrator, determines to be appropriate.
S. 2486 also would require the Secretary to identify the 600 highest priority stationary
sources.
General Duty to Ensure Safe Design, Operation, and Maintenance.
For all stationary sources, S. 2486 would establish a general duty to — 
! identify hazards that may result from a criminal release of a
substance; 
! ensure that the facility is designed, operated, and maintained in a
safe manner; and
! reduce the consequences of a criminal release.
Owners or operators of stationary sources would be required to involve employees
in ensuring the “design, operation, and maintenance of safe facilities,” an obligation
that is defined to include use of inherently safer technology (IST) “to the maximum
extent practicable.”  S. 2486 defines IST as the “use of a technology, product, raw
material, or practice that, as compared to the technology, products, raw materials, or
practices currently in use ... significantly reduces or eliminates the possibility of the
release of a substance of concern, and ... significantly reduces or eliminates the
hazards to public health and safety and the environment associated with the release
or potential release.”  This definition includes such actions as “chemical substitution,
process redesign, product reformulation, and procedural and technological
modification.”
Vulnerability Assessments and Planning Requirements.  Each owner
or operator of a high-priority facility would be required to submit to DHS a written
report that would include a vulnerability assessment, a hazard assessment, and a
prevention, preparedness, and response plan that would incorporate the results of the
assessments and meet requirements established by DHS.  Each plan would have to
include discussion of the practicability of implementing each element of “safe”
facility design, operation, and maintenance.  The bill also requires consultation with
employees at the facility in developing the assessments and plan.
S. 2486 would require the DHS Secretary to review each submitted report to
determine whether it complied with DHS regulations, and to certify approval for
compliant facilities.  In addition, the bill directs the DHS Secretary to notify any
owner or operator who submits a plan that is disapproved.  S. 2486 would establish
an information clearinghouse to assist facilities in complying with requirements.
Enforcement.  S. 2486 would provide administrative, civil, and criminal
penalties for facility owners or operators who failed to comply with a compliance
order or directive issued by the Secretary.  If a threat of a terrorist attack is beyond
the scope of a submitted prevention, preparedness, and response plan, or current
implementation of the plan is insufficient, DHS would be authorized to issue a
compliance order.  If a facility persisted in noncompliance, the Secretary would be
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authorized, after notifying the facility of that fact, to seek judicial relief to abate the
threat.  Such judicial relief could include an order to cease operation and such other
orders as would be necessary to protect public health or welfare.
Coordination.  S. 2486 mandates coordination of implementation for the
Chemical Security and Safety Act with the MTSA and directs the DHS Secretary to
minimize duplication of requirements for risk assessment and response plans under
other federal law.
Information Disclosure.  S. 2486 would protect DHS from public disclosure
requirements of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for “all documents
provided to the DHS Secretary under this Act, and all information that describes a
specific vulnerability or stationary source derived from those documents.”  A few
documents are excepted from this protection, such as compliance certifications by the
DHS Secretary.  In addition, information derived from the protected documents may
be disclosed if it would not divulge trade secrets, not identify any particular
stationary source, and “is not reasonably likely to increase the probability or
consequences of a criminal release.”  No protection is provided for information at
other federal agencies, but state and local government agencies are protected from
disclosure requirements of all federal, state, and local laws.  As for DHS information
protection, a few documents are excepted from protection at state and local
government agencies.
Other Accountability Measures.  S. 2486 would establish Employees’
Safety and Security Committees at stationary sources with at least 15 employees, and
mandates employee training at all stationary sources with respect to the Act’s
requirements.  In addition, the bill would require notification and involvement of
employees in facility inspections and investigations. Protection is provided for
employees who might report problems at their facilities to authorities.
Key Similarities and Differences 
Chemical Sources.  Both bills would direct the Secretary to focus on
chemical sources regulated under the CAA §112(r).  However, S. 2145 provides the
Secretary discretion with respect to designating and requires only that the Secretary
consider “any facility that is a stationary source ... for which the owner or operator
is required to complete a risk management plan....” Facilities required to complete
a risk management plan are those at which a regulated substance is present at a
quantity greater than a threshold quantity (CAA §112(r)(7)).  In contrast, S. 2486
would apply to all stationary sources, which the bill defines with reference to the
CAA §112(r)(2). That definition includes “any buildings, structures, equipment,
installations, or substance-emitting stationary activities” (arguably a wider category
than “facilities”) “(i) which belong to the same industrial group, (ii) which are
located on one or more contiguous properties, (iii) which are under the control of the
same person (or persons under common control), and (iv) from which an accidental
release may occur.”
In addition, both bills would authorize designation of additional facilities for
regulation.  S. 2145, but not S. 2486, exempts facilities owned or operated by the
Department of Energy or the Department of Defense.
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Substances of Concern.  S. 2145 would define “substance of concern” as
a chemical substance present at a chemical source in a quantity equal to or exceeding
the threshold quantity, as established under the CAA §112(r)(3) and (5); ammonium
nitrate, in a quantity to be determined by the Secretary; or any other chemical
substance above a threshold quantity designated by the Secretary.   S. 2486 would
define “substance of concern” similarly but does not include ammonium nitrate in its
definition.
General Duty.  S. 2145 would not impose a general duty on stationary sources
that produce, process, handle, or store any “substance of concern,” as does S. 2486.
The latter would require owners or operators of stationary sources (1) to identify
hazards that may result from a criminal release; (2) to ensure the “design, operation,
and maintenance of safe facilities;” and (3) to eliminate or minimize the
consequences of any criminal release.
Inherently Safer Technology.  S. 2486 would require owners or operators
of stationary sources to ensure the “design, operation, and maintenance of safe
facilities,” which the bill defines to include the use of IST “to the maximum extent
practicable.”  Higher priority stationary sources are required to consider use of IST,
implement IST to the maximum extent practicable, and document consideration in
security and response plans.  S. 2145 does not require consideration or
implementation of IST, although it explicitly allows consideration and use of
technologies that would reduce potential consequences of any successful terrorist
attack as a security measure in a site security plan.
Information Protection.  Both bills would exempt DHS from FOIA
requirements for public disclosure of agency documents.  S. 2145 would prohibit
disclosure of vulnerability assessments, security plans, and components of emergency
response plans for terrorist incidents.  It also prohibits disclosure of materials
developed or produced by a chemical source exclusively in preparation of such
documents and obtained by DHS, to the extent that the record contains information
that (a) describes a specific chemical source or the specific vulnerabilities of a
chemical source; (b) was taken from a vulnerability assessment, site security plan, or
addendum to an emergency response plan, or a copy of such record in possession of
the chemical source; and (c) would, if disclosed, be detrimental to the security of a
chemical source.  S. 2145 directs the Secretary to develop protocols to ensure, to the
maximum extent practicable, that protected information will be maintained in a
secure location and that access will be limited to persons granted access for the
purpose of carrying out the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act.  The bill also
mandates that any officer or employee of a federal, state, or local government agency
who knowingly discloses any protected information be imprisoned for up to one year,
fined under chapter 227 of title 18, United States Code, or both, and if a federal
employee, removed from office or employment.
S. 2486 would exempt DHS from FOIA requirements with respect to “all
documents provided to the DHS Secretary under this Act, and all information that
describes a specific vulnerability or stationary source derived from those documents,”
except for certifications under §6(b), orders under §10(a), and best practices
established under §13(4) of the Chemical Security and Safety Act.  The bill also
would require the Secretary to develop information protection protocols.  However,
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S. 2486 would allow public disclosure of information derived from information
described in §11(a) if it would not divulge trade secrets, identify any particular
stationary source, and “is not reasonably likely to increase the probability or
consequences of a criminal release.”  S. 2486 would not authorize penalties for
unauthorized disclosure of protected information.
Regional and Area Planning.  S. 2145 would establish regional DHS
security offices to oversee facility efforts and area committees to coordinate local,
state, and federal security and emergency response planning.  S. 2486 does not
include such provisions.
Worker Involvement.  S. 2486 would establish Employees’ Safety and
Security Committees at facilities with 15 or more employees to identify, discuss, and
make recommendations to owners or operators concerning potential hazards and risks
relevant to security, safety, health, and the environment.  These committees are to
participate in developing, reviewing, and revising vulnerability assessments, hazard
assessments, and prevention, preparedness, and response plans at their facilities.
Owners or operators would be required to provide employees annually with four
hours of training relevant to security and safety planning.  S. 2145 does not have such
provisions.  Both bills provide protection for employees who might report problems
at their facilities to authorities, but whistle-blower protection provisions are more
extensive and detailed in S. 2486 than in S. 2145.
Table 1 summarizes selected provisions of the two bills.
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Table 1.  Comparison of S. 2145 and S. 2486 
in the 109th Congress
Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Title Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Act [§1]
Chemical Security and Safety Act
[§1]
Key Definitions
Chemical source Defined as a facility designated
by the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
Not defined.  Instead defines
“stationary source” as defined in
the Clean Air Act (CAA)
§112(r)(2) with the addition of any
chemical facility designated by the
DHS Secretary under §5(d) of the




broadly to include measures to
prevent or detect the presence of
terrorists in sensitive areas of the
facility, as well as measures to
reduce consequences in the event
of a successful terrorist attack.
[§2]
Defines “design, operation, and
maintenance of safe facilities” to
include “to the maximum extent
practicable” — 
“use of inherently safer
technology;” measures to make
facilities impregnable; “outreach to
the surrounding community;”
improving site security, employee
training, and coordination with
state and local emergency officials,
law enforcement agencies, and first
responders; and secondary
containment, control, or mitigating
equipment. The definition also
includes use of buffer zones.  
Use of inherently
safer technology
No comparable definition. Defines “use of inherently safer
technology” as use of a technology,
product, raw material, or practice
that significantly reduces or
eliminates the possibility of the
release of a substance of concern,
and significantly reduces or
eliminates the hazards to public
health and safety and the
environment associated with the




Defined as a chemical substance
present at a chemical source in a
quantity equal to or exceeding the
threshold quantity for the
chemical substance, as established 
under the CAA §112(r)(3) and
(5); ammonium nitrate, in a
quantity to be determined by the
DHS Secretary; or any other
chemical substance above a
threshold quantity designated by
the DHS Secretary under §3(i).
[§2]
Defined as any substance listed
under the CAA §112(r)(3) in a
threshold quantity or any other
substance designated by the
Secretary in a threshold quantity
under §5(d) of this Act. Does not




Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Covered Facilities Includes facilities designated by
DHS under §3(a), but not
facilities owned or operated by
the Department of Energy or
Department of Defense.  In
designating facilities, the DHS
Secretary must consider: 
(1) any facility that is a
“stationary source” under the
Clean Air Act (CAA), §112(r)(2)
and for which the owner or
operator is required to complete a
risk management plan in
accordance with CAA §112(r)(7)
(B)(ii); (2) any other facility that
produces, uses, or stores a
“substance of concern”; and (3)
any additional facility that the
DHS Secretary determines shall
be designated a chemical source.
 [§3(c)-(d)] 
Includes all “stationary sources”
under the CAA §112(r)(2), in
addition to any other sources
designated in regulations as “high





Requires the DHS Secretary to
establish criteria for designating
chemical sources by regulation.
The DHS Secretary must base
designation criteria on the
following “risk factors”:
 — perceived threat to a facility;
 — potential extent and likelihood
of serious adverse effects to
human health and safety or to the
environment; 
 — threats to or potential impact
on national security or critical
infrastructure;
 — potential threats or harm to the
economy;
 — proximity of a facility to
population centers;
 — nature and quantity of
substances of concern; and
 — other security-related factors
necessary to protect public health
and safety, critical infrastructure,
and national and economic
security.
[§3(a)-(b)] 
No comparable provision, but
criteria for designating high-
priority sources are similar.  See
“Identifying Priorities” below.
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Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Identifying Priorities Requires the DHS Secretary to
promulgate rules establishing a
risk-based tier system of chemical
sources, consisting of several
tiers, and providing guidance to
owners and operators regarding
actions that would enable a source
to move to a lower risk tier.  One
or more tiers must be “higher
risk” tiers.
Directs the DHS Secretary to
determine the tier applicable to
each  designated chemical source. 
(Note that the listing of facilities
is not through rule-making.)
[§3(e)]
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the Administrator
of the  U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and state
and local government agencies
responsible for planning for and
responding to criminal releases and
for providing emergency health
care, to designate “high priority”
facilities by regulation, based on
“the severity of the threat posed by
a criminal release.” At least 3,000
facilities must be designated “high
priority.”  In designating facilities
“high priority,” the DHS Secretary
must consider:
 — potential severity of harm;
 — proximity to population
centers; 
 — threats to national security;
 — threats to critical infrastructure;
 — threshold quantities of
substances of concern that pose a
serious threat; and
 — other safety or security factors
that the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the  EPA
Administrator, determines to be
appropriate.  Each stationary
source must be considered
individually.  
The DHS Secretary also must
identify the 600 highest priority
stationary sources. [§5(a)-(b) and
§6(c)(1)]
In designating high-priority
categories, the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, is authorized to
designate by rule any chemical
facility as a “stationary source.”
[§5(d)] 
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Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
General Duty No comparable provision. Establishes for each owner and
operator of a stationary source that
produces, processes, handles, or
stores any “substance of concern” a
general duty: (1) to identify
hazards that may result from a
criminal release; (2) to ensure the
“design, operation, and
maintenance of safe facilities;” and
(3) to eliminate or minimize the
consequences of any criminal
release.  Requires that the owner or
operator of a stationary source
involve employees of the source in
each aspect of ensuring the
“design, operation, and
maintenance of safe facilities.”
[§4]
Security Standards Requires the DHS Secretary to
establish security performance
standards for each risk-based tier
of facilities, with stricter
requirements for tiers posing
greater risks. The standards must
allow an owner or operator to
select security measures that, in
combination, satisfy the security
performance standards and must
be risk-based, performance-based,
flexible, and include
consideration of the criteria for
designating chemical sources
[under §3(a)], cost, technical
feasibility, and scale of
operations.    
[§3(f)]
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, and state and local
government agencies, to
promulgate regulations that require
each owner and each operator of a
“high priority” stationary source to
take action to detect, prevent, and
eliminate or reduce the
consequences of terrorist attacks
and other criminal releases. Such
action must be taken in
consultation with local law
enforcement, first responders,
employees, and employee
representatives, and must include
the “design, operation, and




Requires the DHS Secretary to
notify potentially regulated
facilities about the process and
timeline for review and





Requires the DHS Secretary to
review and revise as necessary the
list of designated sources every 3
years.  Authorizes additional
revisions of the list by the DHS
Secretary. 
[§3(h)]
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to review the
regulations designating “high
priority” sources and make
necessary revisions, at least once
every 5 years. 
[§5(e)]
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Requires the owner or operator of
any facility where a threshold
quantity of a substance of concern
is present to petition the DHS
Secretary  for a determination on
whether that facility should be
designated a chemical source, if
that facility has not been required
to complete a risk management
plan (under the CAA §112(r)(7)
(B)(ii).
Directs the DHS Secretary to
consult with the  EPA
Administrator to establish a
mechanism for DHS to receive
timely notice when a facility is
required to complete a risk
management plan in accordance
with CAA §112(r)(7)(B)(ii).
 Requires the owner or operator of
any newly operational facility that
handles at least the threshold
quantity of a substance of concern
to file a petition with the DHS
Secretary for a determination on
whether that facility should be
designated a chemical source. 
[§3(h)]






Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
issue a rule designating or
exempting a chemical substance
as a substance of concern or
establishing or revising the
threshold quantity.  In
promulgating such rules, the DHS
Secretary must consider “the
potential extent of death, injury,
or serious adverse effects to
human health and safety or the
environment and the potential
impact on national security, the
economy, or critical infrastructure
that would result from a terrorist
incident involving the chemical
substance.”  
[§3(i)]
Authorizes the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, for the purpose of
designating “high priority”
categories, to designate by rule any
additional substance that, in a
specified threshold quantity, poses
a serious threat as a “substance of
concern.” [§5(d)] 
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Requires the DHS Secretary to
promulgate regulations requiring
the owner or operator of each
chemical source to conduct a
vulnerability assessment, prepare
and implement a site security
plan, and prepare and implement
an emergency response plan or
addendum to an existing plan. 
The regulations must be risk-
based, performance-based,
flexible, and include
consideration of the criteria for
designating chemical sources
[§3(a)], cost, technical feasibility
and scale of operations.
Authorizes cooperation among
sources operating at contiguous
locations.  Directs the DHS
Secretary to share relevant threat
information with state and local
government officials and with an
owner or operator of a chemical
source.  Specifies content of
vulnerability assessments. 
[§4(a)]
Requires each owner or operator of
a high-priority facility to submit a
report to the DHS Secretary within
6 months of the date on which
regulations are promulgated under
§5(c)(1).  The report must include
a vulnerability assessment, an
assessment of the hazards that may
result from a criminal release; and
a prevention, preparedness, and
response plan. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
notify each stationary source of an
elevated threat if the DHS
Secretary, in consultation with
local law enforcement officials,
determines that a threat of a
terrorist attack exists that is beyond
the scope of a submitted
prevention, preparedness, and





Requires that each site security
plan indicate the tier applicable to
the facility; address risks




appropriate to the tier level that
are “sufficient to deter, to the
maximum extent practicable, a
terrorist incident or a substantial
threat of such an incident;”
include security measures to
mitigate the consequences of a
terrorist incident; describe
contingency plans for the facility;
identify roles and responsibilities
of employees; identify steps taken
to coordinate with government
officials; and describe training,
drills, exercises, and security
actions. 
[§4(a)]
Requires that each plan incorporate
the results of the vulnerability and
hazard assessments.  Required
reports to DHS also must include a
statement as to how the plan meets
the requirements of the regulations;
a statement as to how the
prevention plan meets the general
duty requirements of §4; a
discussion of the consideration of
the elements of “design, operation,
and maintenance of safe facilities,”
including the practicability of
implementing each element; and a
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4 The National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the National Response Team (NRT) are
established by EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard under the authority of Section 105 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (also
known as Superfund, 42 U.S.C. 9605).  The purpose of the NCP and NRT is to coordinate




Requires that an emergency
response plan address the
consequences of a terrorist
incident identified in the
vulnerability assessment; is
consistent with the site security
plan; and identifies the roles and
responsibilities of employees. 
Requires plans to be modified
versions of plans that have been
federally approved or certified
and that are in effect on the date
of enactment, if consistent with
guidance provided by the
National Response Team (NRT)
established under the National
Contingency Plan.4 If no plan
exists, then the owner or operator
is required to develop one by
following guidance provided by
the NRT.  Directs owners or
operators to place security
information in an addendum to
the plan, if necessary, to protect it





Within 6 months of promulgation
of rules requiring vulnerability
assessments, site security plans,
and emergency response plans,
each owner or operator of a
chemical source must certify in
writing to the DHS Secretary that
a vulnerability assessment has
been completed and a site security
plan and an emergency response
plan have been developed and
implemented, and must submit
copies of the vulnerability
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Review and Approval
by the DHS Secretary
of Reports Submitted
by Covered Facilities
Requires the DHS Secretary,
within 5 years of the promulgation
of requirements for vulnerability
assessment and site security and
emergency response planning, to
review submitted documents to
determine whether they comply
with requirements promulgated
under §4(a).  Authorizes
subsequent reviews on a schedule
to be determined by the DHS
Secretary.  Directs the DHS
Secretary to disapprove a
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, or emergency
response plan if it does not
comply with requirements. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
provide the owner or operator a
written notification of any such
disapproval that includes a clear
explanation of deficiencies and to
consult with the owner or operator
to identify steps to achieve
compliance.  
[§4(c)]
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to review each
report submitted to determine
whether the source covered by the
report is in compliance with
regulations promulgated under
§5(c)(1).  Requires the DHS
Secretary, after consultation with
the EPA Administrator, to notify
the stationary source and to
provide advice and technical
assistance to the source, if the DHS
Secretary determines, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, that a report does
not comply, a threat exists that is
beyond the scope of the plan
submitted, or the implementation






Within one year of the
promulgation of requirements for
vulnerability assessment and site
security and emergency response
planning, requires the DHS
Secretary to 1) review and
approve, disapprove, or modify a
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, and emergency
response plan submitted by a
chemical source in a higher-risk
tier; and 2) determine whether the
chemical source is operating in
compliance with the submitted
site security plan and emergency
response plan.
[§4(c)]
Within 2 years of the date on which
reports are required to be
submitted under §5(c)(2), requires
the DHS Secretary to complete
review and certification of all
reports submitted by high-priority
stationary sources. Within 6
months of the date on which
reports are required to be
submitted under §5(c)(2),  requires
the DHS Secretary to review
reports and certify compliance of





Requires the DHS Secretary to
issue a certificate of approval for
facilities in compliance with the
requirements of this Act.
[§9(b)(2)]
Requires the DHS Secretary to
certify each compliance
determination for each “higher
priority” source, and to include a
checklist indicating the
consideration by the source of the
use of elements of “design,








Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
issue an order requiring
certification and submission, if an
owner or operator fails to certify
or to submit a vulnerability
assessment, site security plan, or
emergency response plan.  Directs
the DHS Secretary to issue an
order requiring correction of
specified deficiencies if the owner
or operator does not achieve
compliance by a date to be
determined by the DHS Secretary. 
Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
issue an order for a chemical
source to cease operation, if the
owner or operator continues to be
in noncompliance after an order to
comply with requirements has
been issued.  
[§4(b)-(c)]
Authorizes the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to issue an order
requiring compliance by the owner
or operator of a stationary source
30 days after the date on which the
DHS Secretary first provided
assistance, or the owner or operator
received notice regarding a
deficient report under §6(d)(2),
whichever is later.  An order may
be issued only after such notice and






Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
issue an order to a chemical
source in a higher risk tier to
cease operation, if the DHS
Secretary disapproves its
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, or emergency
response plan or determines that a
chemical source is not operating
in compliance with its site
security plan or emergency
response plan.
[§4(c)]




Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Heightened Security
Measures
Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
issue an order to the owner or
operator of a chemical source
mandating security measures, if
the DHS Secretary determines
that additional security measures
are necessary to respond to a
threat.  Orders may be effective
for up to 90 days, or longer if the
DHS Secretary files an action in a
U.S. district court and the court
authorizes an extension.
[§7]
If the DHS Secretary has notified a
stationary source that a threat of a
terrorist attack exists that is beyond
the scope of a submitted
prevention, preparedness, and
response plan of one or more
stationary sources, or that current
implementation of the plan is
insufficient, and the response by a
stationary source to such
notification is insufficient, the DHS
Secretary is required to notify the
stationary source, the EPA
Administrator, and the Attorney
General.  After the DHS Secretary
provides such notice, the DHS
Secretary or the Attorney General
may secure such relief as is
necessary to abate a threat,
including an order to cease
operation and such other orders as
are necessary to protect public
health or welfare.  Provides district
courts with the jurisdiction to grant
such relief.
[§10(c)(2)]
No comparable provision. Authorizes [by reference to the
CAA §112(r)(9)] judicial relief in





No comparable provision. Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to establish an
information clearinghouse to assist
stationary sources in complying
with this Act. 
[§13]
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Security of a Chemical
Source 
Requires owners or operators of
chemical sources to notify the
DHS Secretary in writing within
60 days of any change to a
chemical source that affects its
security.  Requires owners and
operators to review and resubmit
a modified vulnerability assess-
ment, site security plan, and
emergency response plan, or to
request a waiver from that
requirement.  Requires the DHS
Secretary to provide written
notice to the owner or operator if
additional modification of a
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, or emergency
response plan is required.  
Requires owners or operators to
ensure temporary security
measures are implemented before
the DHS Secretary approves a
modified vulner-ability
assessment, site security plan, or









Requires a facility regulated under
the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) to comply
with the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Act by modifying and
submitting to the Maritime
Security Coordinator and the
DHS Secretary its facility security
assessment and facility security
plan.  Modifications should
ensure compliance with the
security performance standards of
the tier applicable to the chemical
source under the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Act. 
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the Federal
Maritime Security Coordinator, to
determine whether such facility
security assessment and plan meet
the security performance
standards established by the DHS
Secretary. Requires the DHS
Secretary to implement this Act
and the MTSA in “as consistent
and integrated manner as
possible,” and to ensure
coordination between the DHS
Under Secretary for Preparedness
and the Coast Guard
Commandant.
[§4(e)]
Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to minimize
duplication of the requirements for
risk assessments and response
plans under the MTSA.
No comparable provision. Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to minimize
duplication of the requirements for
risk assessments and response
plans under the CAA and other
federal law.  
[§15(a)]
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Alternative Security
Programs
Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
consider a petition submitted by
any person that describes alternate
security procedures, protocols,
and standards established by an
industry entity, government
authority, or other law and the
scope of chemical sources to
which it would apply.  Authorizes
the DHS Secretary to determine
(by rule, regulation, or order)
whether the alternative security
program meets all promulgated
requirements for a vulnerability
assessment, security plan, and
emergency response plan. If the
DHS Secretary determines that all
requirements are met, the DHS
Secretary is required to notify the
petitioner that any chemical
source covered by that program
may submit an assessment or plan
prepared under that program
without revision.  Authorizes the
DHS Secretary to specify (by rule,
regulation, or order) what
modifications would be necessary
to meet promulgated
requirements. Allows an owner or
operator covered by the program
to submit an alternative










Requires the owner or operator of
a chemical source to review the
adequacy of the vulnerability
assessment, site security plan, and
emergency response plan on a
schedule to be determined by the
DHS Secretary, and to certify to
the DHS Secretary that the
chemical source has completed
the review and implemented any
needed modifications.  For a
facility in a higher-risk tier,
requires the DHS Secretary to
establish a timeline that requires
review within one year of the date
of approval of the previous
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, and emergency
response plan, and not less often
than every 3 years thereafter.  For
a facility in any other tier, review
must be required at least every 5
years.
[§4(g)]
Requires the owner or operator of a
high priority stationary source,
within 3 years after the date of
submission of the first report and
every 2 years thereafter, to review
the adequacy of the report, certify
that the review is complete, and
submit to the DHS Secretary any
changes to the assessment or plan. 
[§6(e)]
CRS-21





Requires the owner or operator to
keep a copy of the vulnerability
assessment, site security plan, and
emergency response plan for 5
years after the date on which it
was approved by the DHS
Secretary.  Authorizes the DHS
Secretary to require submission
of, or seek access to and copy,
any required copy of a
vulnerability assessment, site
security plan, or emergency
response plan or any
documentation needed to support
such assessment or plan or to
demonstrate implementation of
such.
Requires the owner or operator to
keep at the stationary source copies
of any vulnerability assessment,
hazard assessment, or prevention,
preparedness, and response plan
required under §5(c)(2).  Provides
to the DHS Secretary and EPA
Administrator, for purposes of
determining compliance with this
Act, authority that is provided to
the EPA Administrator by the CAA
§112(r)(7), §112(r)(9), or §114. 
Includes authority to require an
owner or operator to prepare and
submit hazard assessment, risk
management plans, or emergency
response plans; to establish and
maintain records; make reports;
submit compliance certifications;
or provide information.  
Provides the DHS Secretary with
a right of entry to the premises of
a chemical source and any other
premises on which any required
copy of a vulnerability
assessment, site security plan, or
emergency response plan is
located. 
Authorizes the DHS Secretary and
the EPA Administrator to enter
premises and have access to and
copy records. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
conduct, or require the conduct
of, facility security audits and
inspections to ensure and evaluate
compliance with the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Act.  [§5]
 Directs the DHS Secretary and the
EPA Administrator to establish a
program to conduct regular
inspections.  Requires at least 25%
of inspections to occur without
prior notice to the facility owner or
operator. 
No comparable provision. When notice is provided, the DHS
Secretary or the EPA
Administrator must inform the
owner or operator that public
posting of that notice is required.
When conducting an inspection, an
official must instruct the owner or
operator to afford opportunity to
participate in the inspection to any
employee.  Official explan-ations
of the purpose, scope, procedures,
progress, or outcome of an
inspection or investigation must be
shared with such employees.  
Authorizes officials to interview










If the DHS Secretary determines
that an owner or operator of a
chemical source is not
maintaining, producing, or
permitting access to records or to
the premises of the chemical
source as required, authorizes the
DHS Secretary to issue an order
requiring compliance.
[§5]
Authorizes the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the EPA
Administrator, to issue an order
directing compliance 30 days after
the date on which the DHS
Secretary provides notice to the





Requires the DHS Secretary to
provide necessary infrastructure,
leadership, technical assistance,
guidance, and accountability to
ensure effective security planning
and response in areas surrounding
chemical sources.  Requires the
DHS Secretary to promulgate
regulations, establish
organizations, and take actions to
ensure effective planning and
response in a manner that models
requirements of the MTSA. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
coordinate with and complement
other federal area security and
response committees to provide a







Establishes under the DHS
Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection an office
responsible for implementing and






No comparable general provision. Authorizes the DHS Secretary and
the EPA Administrator to
promulgate such regulations as are
necessary to carry out this Act.
[§15]
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Regional Security
Offices
Requires the DHS Secretary to
establish in each Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) region an Infrastructure
Protection Regional Security
Office, to carry out this Act and
coordinate regional security. 
Requires each office to consist of
DHS personnel in the
Infrastructure Protection Office
within the region, and regional
security advisory staff, to be
appointed by the DHS Secretary. 
Each such office must review and
approve each Area Security Plan
in the region, oversee
implementation of this Act, and
perform other functions as






Requires the DHS Secretary,
within 6 months of enactment of
this Act, to designate geographic
areas for area committees and
planning.  Requires that no area
be larger than a single state, and
all parts of the United States are
to be included in such areas
(except areas designated under
MTSA, which shall not be
included in any newly designated
area).  Allows areas to incorporate
portions of more than one state. 
Establishes an Area Security
Committee and a Coordinator for
each designated area.  Requires
each Coordinator to conduct
audits and inspections of, and
provide guidance and support to,
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Area Security Plans Requires each Area Security
Committee, within 2 years of the
date of enactment, to prepare and
submit to the DHS Secretary an
Area Security Plan for the area. 
Requires that plans coordinate
resources, and coordinate with the
National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, National Response Plan, site
security plans of chemical sources
in the area, other national security
and response plans, and Area
Security Plans for contiguous
areas.  Requires the DHS
Secretary to review and approve
or require amendments to each
Area Security Plan within 24
months of the date of enactment
of this Act. 
[§6(d)]
No comparable provision.
Exercises and Drills Requires the DHS Secretary to
periodically conduct drills and
exercises of security and response
capability in each area for which
an Area Security Plan is required,
and under the site security plan
and emergency response plans of
relevant chemical sources. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
publish annual reports on drills,
including assessments of the
effectiveness of plans.
[§6(e)]
Requires the DHS Secretary and
the EPA Administrator, in
consultation with other federal
agencies and state and local
government officials, to
promulgate regulations requiring
high-priority stationary sources to
participate in emergency
preparedness exercises.  Requires
exercises to be structured based on
the threat posed to the public by a
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Employees’ Safety and
Security Committees
No comparable provision. Within 6 months of promulgation
of regulations under §5(a), requires
the owner or operator of a
stationary source with at least 15
employees to establish a safety and
security committee of employees,
including both non-managerial and
managerial employees, which must
meet at least monthly to identify,
discuss, and make
recommendations to the owner or
operator concerning potential
hazards and risks relevant to
security, safety, health, and the
environment.  An existing health
and safety committee may be
designated to serve as the safety
and security committee.  Such
committee shall participate in the
development, review, and revision
of the vulnerability assessment,
hazard assessment, and prevention,
preparedness, and response plan.
[§7]
Employee Training No comparable provision. Requires the owner or operator of a
stationary source to annually
provide each employee with 4
hours of training — (1) regarding
the requirements of the Chemical
Security and Safety Act; (2)
identifying and discussing
substances of concern; (3)
discussing the prevention,
preparedness, and response plan
for the stationary source; (4)
identifying opportunities to reduce
or eliminate the vulnerability of a
stationary source to a criminal
release through the use of the
elements of “design, operation, and









penalties of not more than
$25,000 per day and not more
than $1,000,000 per year, for
failure to comply with an order or
directive issued by the DHS
Secretary, but only after the DHS
Secretary has provided written
notice of the proposed penalty
and 30 days, during which the
owner or operator may request a
hearing.
Similar, but authorizes
administrative penalty orders of not
more than $50,000 per day and not
more than $2,000,000 per year, for
failure to comply with an order or
directive issued by the DHS
Secretary under §10(a). 
Civil Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
bring an action in a U.S. district
court against any owner or
operator of a chemical source that
violates or fails to comply with
any order or directive issued by
the DHS Secretary or with a site
security plan approved by the
DHS Secretary.  Authorizes the
court to issue an order for
injunctive relief and to award a
civil penalty of not more than
$50,000 per day.
Authorizes a U.S. district court to
issue civil penalties to owners or
operators of facilities in high
priority categories of up to $50,000
per day for violation or failure to
comply with any compliance order
issued under §10(a).
Criminal Authorizes a fine of up to $50,000
per day and/or imprisonment for
up to 2 years for an owner or
operator of a chemical source who
knowingly violates any order
issued by the DHS Secretary or
fails to comply with an approved
site security plan.  [§8] 
Authorizes a fine of between
$5,000 and $50,000 per day and/or
imprisonment for up to 2 years, the
first time that an owner or operator
of a facility in a high priority
category knowingly violates or
fails to comply with a compliance
order under §10(a).  For
subsequent violations or failures,
authorizes fines not less than
$10,000 nor more than $50,000 per









Exempts DHS from public
disclosure requirements of the
federal Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA; 5 U.S. C. §552) for:
(1) any vulnerability assessment,
site security plan, or security
addendum to an emergency
response plan obtained by DHS
under §4; (2) any area security
plan required under §6(d)(4); (3)
any materials developed or
produced by a chemical source
exclusively in preparation of an
assessment, plan, or addendum
and obtained by DHS under §4; or
(4) any record developed
exclusively for the purposes of
this Act by DHS or produced
exclusively for the purposes of
this Act by a chemical source and
obtained by DHS under §4, to the
extent that the record contains
information that (a) describes a
specific chemical source or the
specific vulnerabilities of a
chemical source; (b) was taken
from a vulnerability assessment,
site security plan, or addendum to
an emergency response plan, or a
copy of such record in possession
of the chemical source; and (c)
would, if disclosed, be
detrimental to the security of a
chemical source. 
[§9(a)(1)]
Exempts DHS from public
disclosure requirements of FOIA
for “all documents provided to the
DHS Secretary under this Act, and
all information that describes a
specific vulnerability or stationary
source derived from those
documents,” except for
certifications under §6(b), orders
under §10(a), and best practices





Exempts other federal agencies
from disclosure requirements of
FOIA for any record that DHS
shared with that agency and that is
exempted from disclosure by
DHS in §9(a)(1).  Also provides
an exemption for federal agencies
with respect to records produced
exclusively for the purposes of
this Act by that agency, to the
extent that the record contains
information that (a) describes a
specific chemical source or the
specific vulnerabilities of a
chemical source; (b) was taken
from a record that DHS shared
with that agency and that is
exempted from disclosure by
DHS in §9(a)(1); and (c) would, if
disclosed, be detrimental to the









Exempts state and local
government agencies from
disclosure requirements of state
and local laws for any record that
(1) DHS shared with that agency
under §6 and that is exempted
from disclosure by DHS in
§9(a)(1); and (2) was produced
exclusively for the purposes of
this Act by that agency, to the
extent that the record contains
information that (a) describes a
specific chemical source or the
specific vulnerabilities of a
chemical source; and (b) was
taken from a record that DHS
shared with that agency and that is
exempted from disclosure by
DHS in §9(a)(1), or (c) was taken
from a record (or a copy of such
record in possession of the
chemical source) produced
exclusively for the purposes of
this Act by the agency.
[§9(a)(3)] 
Exempts state and local
government agencies from
disclosure requirements of all
federal, state, and local laws for
“any documents provided by a
stationary source under this Act, or
any information that describes a
specific vulnerability or stationary
source derived from those
documents,” except for
certifications under §6(b), orders
under §10(a), and best practices
established under §13(4). 
[§11(b)]
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Public Information Requires certain documents to be
available to the public under
FOIA, including  self-
certifications by owners or
operators under §4(b) that a
vulnerability assessment has been
completed, and a site security
plan and an emergency response
plan have been developed and
implemented; DHS orders under
§4(b)(3) requiring certification
and submission, if an owner or
operator fails to certify or to
submit such documents;  DHS
compliance certificates for
individual facilities under
§9(b)(2); and the identity of any
chemical source and its owner or
operator for which any other order
or any approval or disapproval is
issued under this Act, including
information identifying the
applicable order, approval, or
disapproval.  
Allows public disclosure of
information derived from
information described in §11(a) if
it would not divulge trade secrets,
identify any particular stationary
source, and “is not reasonably
likely to increase the probability or
consequences of a criminal
release.”
Authorizes the DHS Secretary to
make exceptions for up to 6
months, and to extend them for
intervals not to exceed 6 months
at a time, if the DHS Secretary
finds that security risk would be
increased for a facility if the
record were released.  Requires
the DHS Secretary to inform the
Comptroller General
(Government Accountability
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Report to Congress Requires the DHS Secretary to
submit to Congress a public report
on the performance of chemical







Requires the DHS Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of
the Office of Management and
Budget and appropriate federal
law enforcement and intelligence
officials, in a manner consistent
with existing protections for
sensitive or classified information,
to develop confidentiality
protocols for maintaining and
using records that are protected
from public disclosure by
§9(a)(1)(B), 9(a)(2)(C) and
9(a)(3)(B). (See Exemption from
Federal Freedom of Information
Act above.)
Requires the DHS Secretary to
develop within one year of the date
of enactment of this Act protocols
to protect information described in
§11(a) from unauthorized
disclosure.  Requires protocols to
be in effect before the date on
which the EPA Administrator
receives any report under this Act.
[§11(c)]
Requires protocols to ensure, to
the maximum extent practicable,
that information protected from
public disclosure laws shall be
maintained in a secure location
and access shall be limited to
persons granted access for the







Requires the DHS Secretary to
establish a process by which any
person may submit a report to the
DHS Secretary regarding
problems, deficiencies, or
vulnerabilities at a chemical
source.   Requires the DHS
Secretary to provide guidance to
employees as to how to make
such disclosures without
compromising security. 
Requires the DHS Secretary to
establish and publicize information
regarding mechanisms through
which any person may report an
alleged violation of this Act or a




Accountability Office (GAO) to
report on the problems,
deficiencies, or vulnerabilities
reported and on the DHS









discriminating against a person
who submits a report to the DHS
Secretary.  Requires information
disclosure protocols to
accommodate protections for
disclosures that are not prohibited
by law and are generally
permitted for federal employees
who believe the information is
evidence of a violation of law,
“gross mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or
safety” [5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8) and
§7211].
Prohibits employers from
discriminating against a person
who: (1) notifies the employer,
DHS, or any other appropriate
government agency of an alleged
violation of this Act or of a threat
to the health or safety of the public
relating to chemical security or the
improper release of any harmful
chemical; (2) refuses to engage in
unlawful activity; (3) testifies
before Congress or at any relevant
federal or state proceeding; (4)
commences a proceeding for
administration or enforcement of
this Act; (5) testifies in any such
proceeding; or (6) assists in a
proceeding or in any other action
to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
Directs the DHS Secretary to keep
the identity of a person who
submits such a report confidential.
[§9(d)]
No comparable provision.
No comparable provision. Authorizes an employee to file a
complaint with the Secretary of
Labor alleging discrimination in
violation of this provision. 
Requires the Secretary of Labor to
complete an investigation of the
alleged violation and notify the
complainant of the results within
30 days from the date on which the
complaint was received.  Within 90
days of receiving the complaint,
the Secretary of Labor must issue
an order providing relief or
denying the complaint “on the
record” after notice and
opportunity for public hearing. 
Provides instructions regarding the
basis for decisions by the Secretary
of Labor.  Authorizes a
complainant to bring an action at
law or equity for de novo review of
a complaint in a district court, if
the Secretary of Labor has not
issued a final decision within one
year after the date on which a
complaint was filed. Any person
adversely affected by an order may




Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
Whistle-blower
Protection (cont’d)
No comparable provision. Authorizes the Secretary of Labor
to file a civil action in U.S. district
court if a person has failed to
comply with an order.  Also
authorizes any person on whose
behalf the order was issued to
commence a civil action against the
person to whom the order was
issued.  Authorizes enforcement in
a mandamus proceeding for any






Protects the right to make certain
disclosures under current law or
to a Special Counsel, inspector
general, or other employees who
might be designated by an agency
head.  Also protects the right or
obligation of a chemical source, a
non-governmental organization,
or an individual to disclose







Requires that any officer or
employee of a federal, state, or
local government agency who
knowingly discloses any record
protected from disclosure be
imprisoned for up to 1 year, fined,




State and Other Laws Protects the right of states and
political subdivisions to adopt or
enforce requirements more
stringent than requirements in
effect under the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Act, unless there
is an actual conflict between a
provision of this Act and the law
of a state.
[§10]
The Chemical Security and Safety
Act does not affect any duty or
other requirement imposed under
any other federal, state, or local




Provision S. 2145 (Collins) S. 2486 (Lautenberg)
National Strategy for
Chemical Security
Directs the DHS Secretary, within
6 months of the date of
enactment, to submit to the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs and the
House Committee on Energy and
Commerce an update of the
national strategy for the chemical
sector that was required to be
submitted by February 10, 2006
to the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate and
the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
[§11]
No comparable provision.
GAO Review Directs the DHS Secretary to
provide access by the GAO to any
document or information required
to be submitted to, generated by,
or otherwise in the possession of
DHS under this Act.
[§12]
No comparable provision.
GAO Reports Requires GAO to provide
annually to the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the
House Committee on Energy and
Commerce a review of site
security plans, vulnerability
assessments, and emergency
response plans under the Act and
a determination of whether such






Authorizes such sums as are
necessary to carry out the Act.
[§13]
Similar, but funds remain available
until expended.
[§17]
